Introduction
Environmental management is becoming more complex due to accelerating pressure from growing resource scarcity, declining environmental health, increasing human consumption of resources, changing public preferences, and climate change, all of which are leading to rapidly growing demand for information on environmental valuations (Richardson et al. 2015) .
However, despite an expanding literature and evidence base on the value of non-market environmental assets, much more research is needed to further develop our understanding of the links between the institutions and culture prevailing within nations and the estimated environmental valuations.
The links between institutions and preferences are potentially strong. Institutions play an important role as conventions, norms, and legal rules (North 1990 ) and they shape the relationships between citizens concerning their access to and use of natural resources (Vatn 2005) . Governance structures and political regimes also play a pivotal role in economic policy, including environmental policy (Wehkamp et al. 2018; Rausser and Swinnen 2011) . Moreover, cultural differences also affect environmental preferences and attitudes (see Kountouris and Remoundou, 2016 and references therein).
In this study we consider three channels through which institutions and culture may impact wetland valuations. First, imperfect information and imperfect awareness of available information can affect estimates of environmental valuations. 'Good' institutions can improve access to and awareness of information and thereby enable more informed valuations. Second, institutions can also affect environmental valuations through their impact on incentives. For example, the willingness to pay for public goods is directly related to good governance (Anderson 2017) . Weak institutions reduce trust and the willingness to fund public goods.
Protection of property rights also plays an important role in the willingness to fund public goods (Deininger and Minten 2002) . A third channel is endogenous preferences, whereby institutions and culture, shape values, preferences, and behavior (Bowles 1998; Aghion et al. 2010; Alesina and Giuliano 2015) . Information awareness and incentives are fundamentally different processes to the endogeneity of preferences. Preference endogeneity paves the way for institutions such as the degree of economic freedom to shape preferences, in contrast to traditional, neoclassical economics, wherein preferences are assumed to be fixed and exogenous.
Within the environmental and natural resource literatures, there has been some work exploring the relationship between institutions and environmental outcomes in terms of environmental management (Loomis and Paterson 2014) , and environmental quality (Buitenzorgy and Mol 2010) . The purpose of this article is to extend this line of inquiry by empirically investigating the relationship between institutions and culture and environmental valuations. Specifically, we explore whether institutions and culture influence cross-national differences in wetland valuations. Our contribution to the literature is to offer the first metaregression analysis (MRA) that examines the effects of institutions and culture on environmental valuations. 1 Our focus is the influence of political and economic institutions (economic freedom, democracy, and governance) and cultural traits, norms and values (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and indulgence) on wetland values in developing countries, using a recently assembled dataset of 1,041 valuations of 223 wetlands in 38 developing countries (Chaikumbung, Doucouliagos, and Scarborough 2016) . 2 MRA is ideally suited in this context, as the wetland valuations come from diverse studies, samples, and research designs.
Economic freedom, democracy and governance quality capture different aspects of institutions: the relative importance of markets, the degree of political contests and civil liberties, and aspects of good governance, respectively. In addition to these aspects of institutional 'quality', 3 we also assess the effect of country differences in culture on environmental valuations. This enables a comparison of the deeper roots of culture that change slowly to economic and political institutions that can change much more rapidly (Roland 2004; Tabellini 2008; Luttmer and Singhal 2011) .
Wetland resources are important environmental assets and managing wetland resources has become a major challenge for developing countries. Understanding how institutions affect and potentially shape preferences regarding wetland ecosystem services will extend our understanding of the relationship between institutions in the economy and environmental values and assist with policy and market design for the sustainable management of resources.
Developing countries are urged to transform their institutions: to become more democratic, more market based, and adopt good governance initiatives. At the same time, they are also being urged to protect their environmental assets. For example, environmental sustainability is one of the eight Millennium Development Goals. While 'good' institutions benefit the economy and development, little is known about their impact on environmental valuations.
Which institutions affect environmental valuations? Are policy initiatives to improve institutions consistent with policies for environmental protection?
3 The term institutional 'quality' is widely used when referring to features of institutions. The term reflects a degree of normative judgement. Our use of the term follows the literature and reflects a judgement that less corruption, more effective governance, and greater political representation are preferable, for a range of economic and social outcomes.
The study of institutions, culture, and preferences and their interactions is complex. Vatn (2017) provides an overview of the development of institutional economics which addresses some of these interactions. We make no new theoretical contributions. Instead, we empirically investigate whether institutions and culture are correlated with wetland valuations.
We show in this article that institutions and culture matter. Specifically, economic freedom, government effectiveness, and cultural traits of power distance and indulgence affect wetland valuations in developing countries. We find that the degree of economic freedom plays a prominent role; countries with more economic freedom place smaller valuations on wetlands, on average, and this offsets the positive impact of government effectiveness on valuations.
In the following section we discuss the links between institutions and environmental valuations. Subsequently, we discuss the dataset and the meta-regression methodology. We then present and discuss our findings with respect to the relationship between economic freedom, democracy, governance, and culture and wetland valuations in developing countries.
The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses some of the policy implications.
Institutions and environmental valuations
The theory behind the valuation of environmental goods and services sits within welfare economics and evaluates human well-being based on the behavior and utility of individuals, households, and firms (see for example, Pearce 1993; Garrod and Willis 1999; and Haab and McConnell 2002) . While challenges have been developed to the standard framework for environmental valuation, as discussed for example in Hanley et al (2007) , the neoclassical approach is considered most appropriate for this analysis.
The impact of institutions on environmental valuations is theoretically ambiguous;
arguments can be advanced that institutions increase valuations, reduce them, or have no effect at all. Hence, empirical investigations are essential. Nevertheless, empirical studies of the influence of institutions on the economic value of environmental resources are relatively scarce. In contrast, there are numerous empirical studies that explore the relationship between institutions and environment quality, mostly using economic freedom, democracy, and governance as the main institutional variables. These different dimensions of institutions can potentially have a differential impact on environmental outcomes and valuations.
4
Economic freedom denotes liberalization, or the degree to which agents are free to make decisions and markets function free of government intervention (Wood and Herzog 2014) . Economic freedom reflects several aspects: the size of government, the quality of the legal system and strength of property rights, soundness of money, freedom to trade and burden of regulation. 5 Democracy reflects political representation, political competition, and civil liberties (Downs 1957; Bhattarai and Hammig 2001) . Good governance is a broad term that relates to the process and capacity of government. In this article we focus on three dimensions of good governance: political stability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption (defined in the Data section below).
Institutions can potentially affect valuations of environmental assets in several ways.
Here we discuss three channels through which institutions can affect valuations: (1) information and awareness, (2) incentives, and (3) endogenous preferences. There is a crucial difference between information awareness and incentives on the one hand and changes in preferences on the other. Endogenous preferences are a fundamental departure from the standard neoclassical model of choice. Neoclassical economics treats preferences as fixed and exogenous; consumers are autonomous and preferences are not influenced by social 4 The literature on the impact of institutions on environment outcomes has produced mixed results. See, for example, Deininger and Minten (2002) and Wehkamp et al. (2018) on deforestation. 5 Nevertheless, economic freedom is consistent with some government involvement, e.g. to protect property rights and to enforce the rule of law.
processes/institutions. This assumption simplifies analysis of rational choice (Ng 2004) . Within this framework, institutions can impact on information awareness and incentives but they do not impact preferences. Indeed, the studies included in our meta-analysis report monetary valuations of wetlands using valuation methods that assume a utilitarian framework and that preferences are not influenced by social processes/institutions. In contrast, theories of endogenous preferences acknowledge that institutions can also shape preferences (Vatn 2017) .
Institutions, information and awareness
Valuations reflect preferences and information. Willingness to pay reflects the perceived marginal benefits of environmental asset preservation (Fouquet 2012 ). This will be affected by access to information, and understanding and awareness of environmental costs and benefits.
Imperfect information and imperfect awareness of available information are distinct. Dasgupta et al. (2002, p. 157) Håkansson 2013 on willingness to pay for water quality). 6 This is not to say that greater awareness leads to higher valuations; it could lead to lower valuations. Rather, awareness of 6 Awareness has been linked to willingness to pay for a range of environmental issues. For example, Jalan et al. (2003) find that awareness influences willingness to pay for water purification in India, while Wang et al (2016) link awareness to willingness to pay for smog pollution abatement in China. See also references in Hasselström and Håkansson (2013) .
environmental issues may alter environmental valuations, conditional on all other factors such as individual's attitudes.
Institutions can affect awareness and they can also impact the opportunity cost of wetland services. Some institutions can facilitate the exchange of information on environmental issues, and better enable the communication and expression of community preferences and the conversion of these preferences into environmental policies. Institutions are 'rules of the game' that constrain human interactions and shape incentives (North 1990) and as such affect the costs of market and non-market transactions and the costs of implementing market or non-market based policy responses. 'Good' institutions can facilitate communication of emerging environmental problems and lower the costs of accessing necessary information.
Institutions affect the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to form public policy and provide public goods (Hosseini and Kaneko 2013) . Institutions influence the formulation and implementation of effective environmental policies, and they shape the ability to manage and respond to environmental issues. For example, environmental policies are partly fashioned by community preferences for environmental quality, especially in democracies (Roca 2003; Farzin and Bond 2006) .
Economic valuation reflects people's perceptions of the impact natural resources have on their wellbeing (Lambert 2003) .
Institutions and incentives
Institutions can affect valuations through incentives to protect environmental assets. For example, there is now a relatively large literature on the effects of democracy on environmental policy (e.g., Li and Reuveny 2006; Bernauer and Koubi 2009; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013) . When citizens in a democracy can influence policy, they have greater incentives to inform themselves about environmental issues. This investment may translate into higher wetland valuations as communities become better informed about environmental problems and have greater opportunities to express their preferences for improved environmental outcomes (Payne 1995) , and democratic leaders may be more likely to adopt positive environmental policies favorable to their re-election (Congleton 1992) . In contrast, autocratic leaders may personally benefit from the encroachment of natural resources (Arvin and Lew 2011) . Moreover, by their very nature, autocracies are less likely to provide public goods such as environmental quality (Olson 1993) . Hence, democratic institutions may result in higher valuations for environmental assets, such as wetlands. Nevertheless, more generally, political engagement can either increase or decrease support for wetland conservation.
The willingness to contribute to public goods is also influenced by factors such as fairness, equity, reciprocity, and the behaviors of others (Ostrom 2000; Liebe, Preisendörfer, and Meyerhoff 2011) . These factors are influenced by institutions and indeed become part of the institutional fabric of societies. Where institutions encourage and foster cooperation and reciprocity, then citizens are willing to pay or contribute more for public goods (Ostrom 2000; Liebe, Preisendörfer, and Meyerhoff 2011). 7 Trust in political processes and institutions is also important for willingness to pay (Uslaner 2002; Harring and Jagers 2013; Anderson 2017) .
Hence, we expect that in democracies and societies that encourage cooperation, citizens may assign higher values to, and be more willing to protect, environmental assets. Conversely, countries that are plagued by corruption may find that people are less willing to pay for public goods, as they have little confidence in public officials and organizations to deliver public goods. Several studies have examined the effect of corruption on environmental quality (e.g., Damania et al. 2003; Fredriksson et al. 2004; Cole, Elliott and Fredriksson 2006) . The main finding to emerge from this literature is that corruption hastens environmental degradation. Hosseini and Kaneko (2013) argue that corruption weakens the stringency of environmental policies. Corruption can also reduce public expenditure on environmental public goods and thereby affect valuations. In contrast, willingness to pay is likely to be higher where there is a higher level of trust in non-corrupt institutions (Yogo 2015) .
'Good' governance enables nations to enforce environmental regulations and may enable them to achieve the sustainable use of natural resources. In contrast, states where governance is weak can deplete their natural resources and diminish environmental quality (Wingqvist et al. 2012) . Politically stable countries are more likely to establish and enforce policies that protect the environment that continue across successive administrations (Deacon 1994; Fredriksson and Svensson 2003; Galinato and Galinato 2012) . Political stability creates policy certainty which leads to increased resource conservation in developed countries.
Nevertheless, it is possible that the same certainty may increase consumption and lead to resource exploitation in developing countries.
Conversely, some institutions may reduce willingness to pay. For example, where democracies enable lobbying, rent seeking, and excessive redistribution, policies may become distorted and environmental quality adversely affected (Dryzek 1987 want their subjects to be reasonably content; governance is likely to be better than with roving bandits.
The impact of economic freedom is also uncertain. Economic freedom can increase or decrease willingness to pay depending on its impact on incentives to exploit rather than preserve environmental assets. Economic freedom may lead to lower environmental valuations if it increases the opportunity cost of preserving wetlands. Economic freedom may improve economic efficiency and reduce resource exploitation and environmental degradation (Dinda 2004) , competitive markets may satisfy consumer preferences for a cleaner environment (Le, Chang and Park 2016) , and security of property rights can improve environmental quality (Culas 2007) . Moreover, some regulations can harm the environment (Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor 2001; Wood and Herzog 2014; Mavragani et al. 2016 ).
Institutions and endogenous preferences
As previously stated, neoclassical economics treats preferences as fixed and exogenous.
Nevertheless, it is recognized that an individual's utility is "sharply influenced by his personal history and social environment" (Rayo and Becker 2007, p. 303) . Clearly preferences come from somewhere, e.g. family, geography, church, state, and also from innate characteristics.
Hence, rather than taking preferences as given, much can be learned from treating preferences as endogenous. Frey (1999) argues that values can be just as important as incentives in motivating willingness to pay. Values and attitudes may be shaped by institutions and these differences in attitudes towards environmental assets are then reflected in valuations. There is mounting evidence that preferences (and willingness to pay) may be endogenous to institutions. Bowles (1998) discusses the importance of institutions in shaping individual preferences, norms and behavior, and emphasizes that little is known about the mechanisms that drive these relationships. Gerber and Jackson (1993, p. 639 ) observe endogenous preferences with respect to political processes, noting that: "Individual preferences may be altered by actions taken during the normal sequence of events associated with institutional processes." Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that preferences for redistribution are shaped by culture. Kountouris and Remoundou (2016) find that culture determines environmental preferences.
The impact of institutions on preferences is theoretically ambiguous. For example, economic freedom may reduce willingness to pay if it fosters a more self-interested outlook that places lower importance to the environment. Consequently, people in countries with more economic freedom may assign lower valuations to wetland conservation. Wetland conservation is a public good that requires collective action. The more individual the responses to public good problems, the less likely that they will be adequately tackled (Olson 1965) , i.e. people will tend to place lower valuations on environmental assets. Conversely, a more self-interested outlook could result in higher valuations for environment assets if self-interested individuals recognise the need for collective action to preserve wetlands. Taking an eclectic approach, we see institutions as both external constraints (e.g. as per
North's 'rules of the game') and also as potentially shaping values, preferences and social norms (e.g. as per social constructivism, see Vatn 2017) . In social constructivism, preferences are shaped through social interactions and collaboration with other people and institutions.
Hence, based on the literature above, we hypothesize that expressing environmental valuations is influenced by institutions and cultural attitudes. Institutions have the potential to influence wetland valuations through their effects on information awareness, incentives, and possibly preferences. Given the different dimensions of institutions and the diverse predictions regarding these individual dimensions, the net effect of institutions is an empirical matter, which motivates our meta-analysis of the extant evidence. We investigate this hypothesis through meta-regression analysis of 1,041 estimates of wetland valuations, from 283 studies, for 223 wetlands in 38 developing countries.
Data
Our data extraction, meta-analysis, and reporting of results follows the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research Network (MAER-Net) guidelines for meta-analysis in economics (Stanley et al. 2013) . Our principal data are drawn from Chaikumbung, Doucouliagos, and Scarborough (2016) . These data cover all published and unpublished studies that report estimates of wetland valuations in developing countries. 10 We supplement these data with information collected from several external sources, as outlined below.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is measured as the annual value per hectare as the dependent variable. 
External information
In order to investigate the effects of institutions and culture on wetland valuations, it was necessary to collect data from sources external to the empirical studies. We carefully matched data on institutions for the same period as the primary study. Note that none of the 283 studies actually explored the impact of institutions on wetland valuations; instead, they provide estimates of the value of different wetlands. However, by pooling these studies together, we can take advantage of spatial and time variation in institutions, at the time the primary valuation studies were conducted, to formally test whether these contextual differences affected the reported wetland valuations.
The degree of economic freedom was quantified by the index reported by the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW); see Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2016) . 13 This index is measured on a scale between 0 and 10, where 10 is the highest degree of economic freedom.
In our data, the index ranges from 3.52 to 7.57, respectively. For democracy, we use the Polity II data from The Polity Project. 14 The polity measure ranges from −10 (autocratic) to +10
(democratic) with a higher level for a stronger democracy. The average democracy level in our sample is 2.39.
Governance was quantified using three series-government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political stability-from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. 15, 16 Each governance index takes a range -2.5 to 2.5 with a higher score for a better governance. The average score of government effectiveness, political stability, and corruption control in our sample are -0.004, -0.327, and -0.328 respectively. 17 Government effectiveness reflects "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies" (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2011, p. 223) . Political stability is defined as the likelihood that a government will not be "destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means" (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2011, p. 223) . Corruption refers to the use of public funds for private gain.
The World Development Indicators were used to source data on GDP per capita and the Gini index. Finally, data on estimates of cultural differences was collected from Geert
Hofstede. 18 We investigate all six dimensions of culture: individualism, power distance, 14 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html. Accessed December 23 rd , 2017. The Polity democracy index is an aggregation of several components: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, constraints on Chief executive, regulation of participation, and competitiveness of participation. 15 These indices are based on experts' perceptions of the quality of governance. https://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators. Accessed January 27 th , 2018. 16 The World Bank provides six indicators of governance: ccorruption control, political stability, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, rule of law, and regulation accountability. We focus on the three main series used in the environmental quality literature. Moreover, voice and accountability is captured by our democracy indicator and rule of law is captured by our economic freedom indicator. 17 In some applications, the average of the various components is used. However, the individual components can be associated with varying effects on valuations. Hence, it is preferable in our case to use the individual components. 18 http://geerthofstede.com/research-and-vsm/dimension-data-matrix/. Accessed December 23 rd , 2017. masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation, and indulgence; see Table 1 Figure 1 suggests a positive correlation between control for corruption and wetland valuations. Below we show that controlling for other factors, control for corruption is inversely related to wetland valuations, on average. 20 Inequality is included as it influences the willingness to pay taxes and the willingness to fund public goods. Income is included as it has been shown to affect willingness to pay (Chaikumbung, Doucouliagos, and Scarborough 2016) and also because institutions can affect income and hence it is important to isolate the impact of income from institutions.
appendix presents country specific wetland valuations and data on the median value of the institutional variables. Table A3 presents a correlation matrix. 
Meta-regression methodology
Meta-regression involves the application of regression analysis to the pool of comparable empirical estimates. We regress wetland values on a vector of covariates relating to institutions, culture, policy site characteristics, and authors' research design choices:
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(1)
where is the annual wetland value per hectare in 2002 US$ (in logarithmic form), I is a vector of variables that reflect institutions and culture, X is a vector of control variables, β0 is the constant term, βI and βc contain the estimated coefficients on the measures of institutions and other moderator groups of explanatory variables, respectively, and u is the error term.
Ideally, Eqn (1) is estimated using unrestricted weighted least squares, using inverse variance weights Doucouliagos 2015, 2017) . By assigning greater weight to the more precise estimates, these weights can be shown to be optimal (Hedges and Olkin 1985 Moreover, it is also possible that there is no association between institutions and preferences and instead other factors shape both political and economic institutions and preferences. One such factor may be underlying cultural differences between countries. If not controlled for in the MRA, this would be an omitted variable.
Results
The meta-regression results are presented in table 2, where for the sake of brevity, only the main variables of interest are presented; the full results are available in the appendix, table A4.
Columns (1) and (2) (7) we use longer, ten-year, lags in institutional variables; these results are even less likely to be afflicted with reverse causality. (2) include only the institutional variables. Covariates added to Columns (3) to (5): GDP per capita, year of survey, Gini index, regional dummies, latitude, population density, wetland characteristics, wetland ecosystem services, wetland types, valuation methods, and publication characteristics. Institutional variables lagged three years in columns (2), (4), (5), and (6), and ten years in column (7). Some studies drop out due to insufficient data on some of the explanatory variables. Figures in brackets are standard errors, adjusted for clustering of wetland valuations within studies. *, **, ***, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Institutions matter
Our results confirm that institutions influence valuations. Economic freedom has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. This result is robust to inclusion of various controls, including cultural differences between countries. This finding suggests that the more market-based a nation, the less people value wetlands. One explanation for this is that citizens in market-based societies are more individualistic and more driven by the pursuit of maximizing short-run economic returns than protecting wetland resources over the long-run. Consequently, people in countries with more economic freedom assign lower values to wetland conservation. Wetland conservation is a public good that requires collective action. The more individual the responses to public good problems, the less likely that they will be adequately tackled (Olson 1965) . A further explanation is that it is possible that the more market-based a country, the higher the opportunity cost of favoring environmental values over direct use market values. The higher opportunity cost of environmental outcomes may explain why the impact of economic freedom on wetlands is economically significant and negative.
In contrast, government effectiveness has a positive coefficient suggesting that this measure of good governance is correlated with larger wetland valuations. One explanation for this is that greater government effectiveness means greater ability to implement policies favorable to the environment and policies that reflect community preferences. Evidently, this increases wetland valuations.
Control of corruption has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant in some models. This suggests that people in more (less) corrupt countries value wetlands more (less) highly. At first blush this result is somewhat counter-intuitive, as we expect corruption to reduce incentives to contribute to public goods (Beekman, Bulte and Nillesen 2014) . However, the effects of corruption could theoretically go either way. Corruption can lead to overexploitation of natural resources. Nevertheless, it is also possible that corruption may encourage respondents to express preferences for environmental non-market values as they see the proceeds of development and market direct use values going to a few via corruption rather than to society more generally. Another explanation is that corruption may also offer a way to preserve environmental assets from inefficient bureaucrats. Bribes and corruption may be a way of getting things done. So, with more corruption, citizens are willing to pay more to protect wetlands. This is the idea that corruption helps to grease the wheels of an inefficient bureaucracy. For example, Beck and Maher (1986) argue that corruption can replace competitive markets. Competition results in greater efficiency. Nevertheless, the inefficiency of bureaucrats may be offset by bribes. Government officials may not have sufficient information or competency (Méon and Sekkat 2005) . Corruption offers a way to resolve these problems. In such settings, people may be more willing to pay to protect wetlands, as they know that things can get done through corruption. However, if corruption declines while other distortions remain (like incompetent and inefficient bureaucracies), then citizens may be less able to get things done and wetlands less likely to be protected. In this case, people may be less willing to pay to protect environmental assets. It should be recalled that the MRA controls for factors such as income, inequality, and population density. Thus, the MRA is indicating that controlling for these factors and also controlling for institutions, corruption may be 'greasing the wheels'.
The MRA suggests that democracy and political stability are not significant factors in wetland valuations.
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Two of the six culture variables appear to influence valuations. Both power distance and indulgence are negatively associated with wetland valuations. Power distance reflects the degree to which the less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. High power distance means that people do not expect to be actively consulted and they do not expect to participate in decisions that impact their lives. In high power distance cultures people do not question authority and they comply with decisions 22 The MRA also confirms that socio-economic and wetland characteristics influence wetland valuations. Wetland size is inversely related to wetland valuations. Urban wetlands have a higher valuations than those in rural settings. Wetlands that provide for biodiversity and marine wetlands are also more highly valued, while palustrine wetlands are less valued, relative to estuarine (the base). 23 Thus, the responses appear to be larger for economic freedom and culture, then they are for governance.
These elasticities suggest that wetland values in developing countries are relatively more sensitive to the degree of economic freedom. Market liberalization policies are likely to have a larger response and improvements in government effectiveness a smaller response.
Robustness
We explored the robustness of the results in several ways. These results are presented in Next, we consider whether the results are sensitive to the valuation method. Our approach has been to follow the prior literature (e.g., Chaikumbung, Doucouliagos, and Scarborough 2016) and pool the estimates from the various valuation methods. We tested the sensitivity of the results to removing groups of studies associated with specific valuation methods. These results are reported in the appendix, table A6, where it is shown that the results for the institutional and cultural variables are robust to the valuation method (the one exception is indulgence in two cases).
Discussion and implications
This article contributes to understanding of the relationship between institutions and culture and environmental preferences through a comprehensive meta-regression analysis of the evidence base of 283 valuation studies covering 223 wetland sites in 38 developing countries.
We focus on the effects of economic freedom, democracy, and three measures of 'good' governance (corruption, political stability, and government effectiveness) on wetland values in developing countries. We also investigate the effects of long-lived cultural differences (power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation, and indulgence) on environmental preferences.
Institutions shape the values citizens place on wetlands in developing countries. Our central finding is that citizens assign lower values to wetlands in countries with greater economic freedom. Greater economic freedom means greater reliance on markets to allocate scarce resources. While economic freedom is, on average, welfare enhancing and growth promoting, it also comes at a price of citizens' assigning lower value on environmental quality and environmental assets; at least for wetlands in developing countries. It is possible that this reflects higher opportunity costs of environmental protection in economies with welldeveloped markets for direct use values. This finding may reflect less awareness of environmental problems or possibly that citizens in more market-based economies are more individualistic and less willing to contribute to public goods.
We also find that cultures that are more indulgent and more authoritarian assign lower values on environmental assets. In contrast, government effectiveness results in higher valuations. This, however, only partly offsets the effects of economic freedom and culture.
Consequently, in net terms, 'good' institutions reduce wetland values. For example, the estimated elasticities from the MRA can be used to estimate the change in wetland values as a result of changes in institutions over time. In the case of China, we predict that wetland valuations fell by 13%, on average, between 1996 and 2013. In the case of India, wetland valuations fell by 4%, on average between 1999 and 2012. These cases illustrate that moves to reform institutions in developing nations may have an unintended consequence of lowing valuations of wetlands, thereby adding pressure to these scarce environmental assets.
Reducing economic freedom is not a policy that we advocate. Improvements in institutions through greater government effectiveness and enhanced security of property rights 25 rather than limiting economic freedom may ultimately reduce pressure on wetland resources and lead to better environmental health.
Our results show that across space and time institutions are correlated with wetland valuations. This correlation might, of course, be spurious and driven by unobserved factors that influence both institutions and wetland valuations. The association might, however, be causal.
Causality might reflect endogenous preferences arising from changes in political and economic institutions and differences in culture. Causality might also reflect the impact of changes in institutions on constraints, incentives, and opportunity costs. While the findings confirm the endogeneity of preferences with respect to some cultural traits (power distance and indulgence), our data and methodology do not enable us to disentangle these various observationally equivalent factors to identify the underlying channels. Do the links between wetland values and economic freedom stem from endogenous preferences? Are the primary drivers from the effects of institutions on the incentives to fund public goods or the opportunity costs of environmental management decisions? Nevertheless, our results suggest that institutions appear to be important and that further research is warranted to confirm this finding and importantly to uncover the underlying channels. Disentangling these effects is an important area for future research. The possibility that preferences are endogenous to economic and political institutions is particularly important as it suggests that the effectiveness of policies to protect wetlands is influenced by institutions and culture. Indeed policy itself might affect preferences and hence effectiveness (Bar-Gill and Fershtman 2005) . Hence, preference development cannot be ignored in the protection of wetlands.
Our findings also have implications for meta-analyses and benefit transfer, in particular.
Thus, the finding that institutions matter suggests that failing to control for institutions can lead to omitted variable bias in meta-regression and benefit transfer. For example, in their benefit transfer of wetlands, Chaikumbung, Doucouliagos, and Scarborough (2016) did not consider institutional variables.
The results highlight the dilemma of the trade off between development and preservation. Changes in some institutions, particularly greater economic freedom, will put greater pressure on environmental assets. This is an important finding that both national governments and international bodies such as the World Bank need to consider. The results presented here suggest that some of the stated policy objectives clash. 
Government effectiveness
The quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures and the quality of policy formulation and implementation. Notes: Estimation uses unrestricted weighted least squares, using sample size weights. Institutional variables lagged three years in Columns (2), (4), (5), (6), and (7). Some studies drop out due to insufficient data on some of the explanatory variables. Figures in brackets are standard errors, adjusted for clustering of wetland valuations within studies.*,**, ***, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively Notes: Estimation uses unrestricted weighted least squares, using sample size weights. Institutional variables lagged three years in all cases. Some studies drop out due to insufficient data on some of the explanatory variables. Figures in brackets are standard errors, adjusted for clustering of wetland valuations within studies.*,**, ***, denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
